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a b s t r a c t
We study the limitations imposed by truthfulness for two non-utilitarian multi-parameter
optimization problems. The first is the workload minimization in inter-domain routing
problem, and the other is the unrelated machines scheduling problem. Our main findings
can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. We prove that any truthful deterministic mechanism and any universal truthful
randomized mechanism for workload minimization in inter-domain routing cannot
achieve approximation ratio better than 2. These results improve the current lower
bounds of (1+√5)/2 ≈ 1.618 and (3+√5)/4 ≈ 1.309 due to Mu’alem and Schapira
[A. Mu’alem, M. Schapira, Setting lower bounds on truthfulness, in: Proceedings 18th
annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2007, pp. 1143–1152].
2. We establish a lower bound of 1 + √2 ≈ 2.414 on the achievable approximation
guarantee of any truthful deterministic mechanism for unrelated machines scheduling
when the number of machines is at least 3. This lower bound is comparable to a recent
result by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali [G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A.
Vidali, A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms, in: Proceedings 18th annual ACM-
SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2007, pp. 1163–1170].
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of the most fundamental results in the field of mechanism design states that every utilitarian social choice function
admits a mechanism that truthfully implements it, namely, a member of the VCG family [17,5,8]. In stark contrast with
this finding, when one considers non-utilitarian social choice functions, it turns out that no guarantees can be made, i.e.,
there are non-utilitarian functions, which cannot be truthfully implemented (see, e.g., [14]). In light of this state of affairs,
one natural objective of research is to understand the inherent limitations in the infrastructure of truthful mechanisms for
non-utilitarian social choice functions.
In this paper, we focus our attention on studying the boundaries imposed by truthfulness for two non-utilitarian multi-
parameter optimization problems. The first is the workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem, which models
one of the most principle problems in the design of routing protocols, and the other is the unrelated machines scheduling
problem, which is one of the most classical and general variants in the field of scheduling.
The problems.We study theworkload minimization in inter-domain routing problem. As input to this problem, we are given
a directed graph G = (V , E) such that n = |V |, every edge e ∈ E has a cost ce ∈ R+, and there is a designated target vertex
t ∈ V . An additional ingredient of the input is a setR of connection requests, where every request r ∈ R is characterized
by a pair (sr , dr) such that sr is the source vertex of the request and dr ∈ R+ is the demand or traffic intensity associated
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with the request. The objective is to find a confluent routing tree in which the workload imposed on the ‘‘busiest’’ vertex
is minimized. That is, one would like to assign, for each request r , a path from sr to t on which the request’s demand will
be routed. The set of paths should constitute a confluent routing tree, i.e., a tree in which all traffic arriving at any vertex
leaves along a single edge. Denoting by RTu the set of requests that route their demand using a path that goes through u in a
confluent routing tree T , and by cTu the cost of the single edge that leaves u in T , the goal is to find a tree T that minimizes
maxu∈V cTu
∑
r∈RTu dr .
We also consider the unrelated machines scheduling problem. An instance of this problem consists of nmachines and m
tasks such that the execution time of task j on machine i is determined by the tij entry of an n×mmatrix t . The objective is
to allocate the tasks to the machines in a way that minimizes the makespan, that is, the maximum completion time of the
machines. This goal is equivalent to generating an n×m allocationmatrix x in which every xij entry is a {0, 1}-indicator such
that xij = 1 if and only if task j is allocated tomachine i, every task is assigned to exactly onemachine, namely,∑i∈[n] xij = 1
for every j ∈ [m], and maxi∈[n]∑j∈[m] xijtij is minimized.
The setting. In this paper, we study the above-mentioned problems from an algorithmic mechanism design [14] point of
view. Algorithmic mechanism design considers the design of protocols or mechanisms for algorithmic problems in scenarios
where the input is presented by strategic agents. A strategic agent might declare a fallacious input in order to manipulate
the protocol in a way that will maximize its own utility. A primary interest of algorithmic mechanism design is in the
development of incentive compatible or truthful protocols, which are robust against manipulation by agents, i.e., every agent
is rationally motivated to truthfully report its input. Particularly, in the present paper, we concentrate on lower bounding
the achievable approximation guarantee of any truthful protocol for the problems under consideration. Note that in the
workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem, every vertex is assumed to be controlled by a strategic agent,
which may be dishonest about the costs of the vertex’s outgoing edges. Similarly, in the unrelated machines scheduling
problem, every machine is assumed to be controlled by a strategic agent, which may be untruthful about the execution
times of the tasks on the corresponding machine. For example, the agent that controls machine imay be deceitful about the
corresponding row vector of execution times ti = ⟨ti1, . . . , tim⟩.
1.1. Our results
Workload minimization in inter-domain routing. We establish that any truthful deterministic mechanism for the
workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem cannot achieve approximation guarantee better than 2.
Additionally, we reinforce this inapproximability result by demonstrating that no randomizedmechanism, which is truthful
in the universal sense, can obtain approximation ratio better than 2. These results improve upon the lower bounds exhibited
by Mu’alem and Schapira [13], which are (1+√5)/2 ≈ 1.618 and (3+√5)/4 ≈ 1.309, respectively. The specifics of these
findings are presented in Section 3.
Unrelated machines scheduling. We prove that any truthful deterministic mechanism for the unrelated machines
scheduling problem cannot yield approximation guarantee better than 1 + √2 ≈ 2.414, for input instances that have
at least 3 machines. This result is based on the work of Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali [4], which established the
same lower bound. Our approach differs from this previous result by utilizing algebraic tools instead of geometrical ones.
This leads to a significantly simpler proof. Further details are provided in Section 4.
1.2. Related work
The workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem models one of the most fundamental problems in the
design of routing protocols. Specifically, it captures the problem of establishing a routing tree for a network (e.g., the
Internet) in which no single autonomous system (AS) is excessively congested. This problem was introduced by Mu’alem
and Schapira [13], who posed it as a natural extension to the inter-domain routing problem, which was formulated by
Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami and Shenker [7]. It seems noteworthy to mention that our definition of the problem is
slightly different from the original formulation. However, one can easily verify that they are essentially equivalent. Mu’alem
and Schapira proved that this problem cannot be approximated to within factors of (1 + √5)/2 and (3 + √5)/4 by any
truthful deterministic mechanism and any randomized mechanism that is truthful in the universal sense, respectively.
In addition, they designed a simple truthful deterministic mechanism that obtains approximation ratio of n. They also
considered the single-parameter variant of the problem, in which all the outgoing edges of a vertex have the same cost, and
demonstrated that this variant can be solved in an optimal way by a truthful deterministic exponential-time mechanism.
The problem of unrelated machines scheduling is one of the most classical and general variants in the field of scheduling
and as such, it has been given extensive attention in the past years, both from an algorithmic point of view and from a
game-theoretic one. From a pure algorithmic point of view, the problem is known to admit 2-approximation algorithms
(see, e.g., [11,16,1]), and is known to be 3/2-hard to approximate in polynomial time, unless P = NP [11]. The mechanism
design version of the problem originates in the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [14]. They proposed a polynomial-
time truthful deterministic mechanism achieving approximation guarantee of n, and also proved that no deterministic
mechanismcanobtain approximation ratio better than2. They also conjectured that this gapwill be resolvedby showing that
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no deterministic mechanism can attain approximation ratio better than n. Finally, they demonstrated that randomization
may help to obtain better outcome by presenting a randomized truthful mechanism for a twomachines scenario, which has
approximation ratio of 7/4. Mu’alem and Schapira [13] extended the last result for nmachines, and devised a randomized
truthful mechanism attaining an approximation ratio of 0.875n. In the same work, they also established a lower bound of
2 − 1/n on the achievable approximation guarantee of any randomized mechanism. Later on, Lu and Yu [12] presented a
0.836n-approximation randomized truthful mechanism. Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali [4] proved that any truthful
deterministicmechanism cannot yield approximation guarantee that is better than 1+√2, for 3machines ormore. Recently,
Koutsoupias and Vidali [9] demonstrated that no truthful deterministic mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better
than 1 + φ ≈ 2.618 when the number of machines goes to infinity. Here, φ denotes the golden ratio. A concurrent line
of work, initiated independently by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács [3] and Lavi and Swamy [10], studied special
variants of the unrelated machines scheduling problem. Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács considered the fractional
variant of the problem, and devised a deterministic polynomial-time truthfulmechanism that attains an approximation ratio
of (n+1)/2, while proving that this fractional variant cannot be truthfully approximatedwithin a factor better than 2−1/n.
Lavi and Swamy researched the ‘‘low–high’’ variant of the problem, inwhich the execution time of every tasks is either ‘‘low’’
or ‘‘high’’, and designed a 3-approximation truthful-in-expectationmechanism. They also presented a truthful deterministic
2-approximation mechanism for the case that all the tasks share the same ‘‘low’’ and ‘‘high’’ values, and demonstrated that
in this case no truthful deterministic mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better than 1.14.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we exhibit a brief introduction to the field of algorithmic mechanism design, and then turn to describe
a key property, which every truthful deterministic mechanism must satisfy. This property is fundamental to our approach
as our lower bound proofs are built upon it. Bear in mind that this section strives to provide a succinct description of the
relevant definitions and results of Bikhchandani et al. [2], and hence, the keen reader is encouraged to refer to the aforesaid
paper for a more comprehensive presentation of the underlying concepts.
In an algorithmicmechanism design problem setup, there is a collection of n strategic agents and a finite set of alternatives
(outcomes) A. Every agent i has a private type represented by a valuation function vi : A → R+. This type models
the preference of an agent with respect to the different alternatives. The goal is expressed by a social choice function
f : V1 × · · · × Vn → A, where Vi denotes the domain of all valid valuation functions of agent i. One well-known social
choice function is the utilitarian function, which aims to maximize the social welfare, i.e., to find an alternative a for which∑
i∈[n] vi(a) is maximized. A primary interest of algorithmic mechanism design is in the development of mechanisms that
implement a social choice function in a truthful way. Amechanism consists of an allocation algorithm g : V1× · · ·× Vn → A,
and a collection of payment functions p1, . . . , pn, where pi : V1 × · · · × Vn → R determines the payment of agent i. A
mechanism is said to implement a social choice function f if the outcome of its allocation algorithmmatches the outcome of
f , for every valid tuple of valuations. Furthermore, a mechanism is called truthful if its payments motivate truthful behavior
of the agents, that is, no agent has incentive to be dishonest when reporting its valuation. More formally, given amechanism
M = (g, p1, . . . , pn), the utility of agent i with respect to reported types v˜ is defined as ui(v˜) = vi(g(v˜)) − pi(v˜). Now, M
is truthful if every agent maximizes its utility when truthfully reporting its type. Namely, ui(v˜) ≥ ui(v′), for every agent i,
every v˜ such that v˜i = vi, and every v′ which differs from v˜ only in the valuation of agent i.
We now turn to describe a property that every truthful deterministic mechanismmust satisfy. This property reduces the
goal of establishing a lower bound on the achievable approximation ratio of truthful deterministic mechanisms to that of
proving a lower bound for a restricted class of allocation algorithms that underlie truthful mechanisms. We will henceforth
refer to such allocation algorithms as truthful allocation algorithms. Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) be a tuple of valuations, and let
v−i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, vn) be the tuple of valuations obtained by removing the valuation of agent i from v.
Definition 2.1. An allocation algorithm g is said to be weakly monotone if
vi(a)+ v′i(b) ≤ v′i(a)+ vi(b),
for every i ∈ [n], every vi, v′i and v−i, and a = g(vi, v−i) and b = g(v′i , v−i).1
Theorem 2.2 ([2]). If M = (g, p1, . . . , pn) is a truthful mechanism then g is weakly monotone.
Remark that Saks and Yu [15] proved that the weak monotonicity property is not only necessary for truthfulness, but for
convex domains is also sufficient. Nonetheless, this fact will not be utilized in the context of this paper.
1 Note that this definition applies for cases in which the valuation function of an agent represents cost induced on that agent (e.g., it applies for the
problems under consideration). For cases in which the valuation function of every agent corresponds to profit, the inequality is in the opposite direction,
i.e.,≥ instead of≤.
I. Gamzu / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 626–632 629
3. Workload minimization in inter-domain routing
In this section, we study the workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem, and establish a lower bound of 2
on the achievable approximation guarantee of any truthful deterministicmechanism and any universal truthful randomized
mechanism. Before we describe the finer details of our approach, we provide an interpretation of the weak monotonicity
theorem, that is, Theorem 2.2, for the problem under consideration. Note that the valuation function of the agent that
controls vertex u satisfies vu(a) = d · ce, where d is the total traffic that goes through u in the routing tree defined by
the outcome a, e is the single edge that leaves vertex u in that routing tree, and ce is its cost.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose we are given two input instances for the workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem, which
only differ in the cost functions on the edges. In particular, suppose that the cost functions c and c ′ only disagree on vertex u’s
outgoing edge costs. Every truthful allocation algorithm must satisfy that if
• e and e′ are two outgoing edges of u,
• d units of traffic are routed through e in the routing tree generated with respect to c,
• d′ units of traffic are routed through e′ in the routing tree generated with respect to c ′,
then
d(ce − c ′e)+ d′(c ′e′ − ce′) ≤ 0.
Wenow turn to argue about the deterministic lower bound. In particular, we prove that any truthful allocation algorithm
has a ‘‘poor’’ input instance for which it generates a routing tree whose workload value is bounded away from the optimal
workload value by a factor of at least 2.
Theorem 3.2. The approximation ratio of any truthful deterministic mechanism for the workload minimization in inter-domain
routing problem cannot be better than 2.
Proof. Consider a truthful allocation algorithm for the problem under consideration, and suppose that its input is the
directed graph schematically described in Fig. 1(a), and the set of requests isR = {r1, r2} = {(s1, 1), (s2, 1)}.
a b
Fig. 1. The deterministic lower bound instances.
Notice that if the algorithm routes both requests using the vertex u, the obtained routing tree has a workload value of
2. Also notice that an optimal routing tree for this instance has a workload value of 1; for instance, the routing tree which
consists of the edge set {(s1, t), (s2, t)}. Hence, in such a case, we attain that the algorithm cannot have approximation ratio
better than 2. Accordingly, we may assume throughout the remainder of this proof and without loss of generality that the
algorithm routes the request r1 through the edge (s1, t).
Now, suppose the algorithm is given as input to the directed graph schematically described in Fig. 1(b), and the same set
of requests as before. Note that the only difference between this input instance and the aforementioned input instance is
the costs of the edges that leave s1. Specifically, c(s1,t) = 2, and c(s1,u) = 1+ ϵ, where 0 < ϵ < 1 is constant. We claim that
the algorithm, given this input instance, must also route the request r1 through the edge e = (s1, t). This follows from the
observation that if the request r1 is routed through the edge e′ = (s1, u), we obtain a contradiction to Corollary 3.1, since
d = 1, d′ = 1, ce = 1, c ′e = 2, c ′e′ = 1+ϵ, and ce′ = 0. Consequently, the workload value of the routing tree generated by the
algorithm is at least 2, whereas the optimal routing tree has a workload value of 1+ ϵ, e.g., the routing tree that comprises
the edge set {(s1, u), (u, t), (s2, t)}. This establishes that the algorithm cannot have approximation guarantee better than
2/(1+ ϵ). Since one can select any positive constant ϵ → 0, the theorem follows. 
In the following, we reinforce the last theorem by establishing a lower bound of 2 for universally truthful randomized
mechanisms. Note that such mechanisms are defined as a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms
[14,6]. In particular, this definition implies that for any fixed outcome of the random choices made by the randomized
mechanism, the agents maximize their utility by reporting their valuations truthfully. Our approach is based on Yao’s
minimax principle [18]. In the context of our setting, this principle states that the approximation ratio of the best universal
truthful randomized mechanism is equal to the approximation ratio of the best deterministic truthful mechanism under
a worst-case input distribution. Accordingly, we exhibit a probability distribution over input instances for which any
deterministic truthful mechanism cannot attain approximation guarantee better than 2.
Theorem 3.3. The approximation ratio of any universal truthful randomized mechanism for the workload minimization in inter-
domain routing problem cannot be better than 2.
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Proof. Let I denote the input instance, which consists of the directed graph schematically described in Fig. 2, and the set
of requests R = {r1, r2, . . . , rk} = {(s1, 1), (s2, 1), . . . , (sk, 1)}. Additionally, let Ij be the input instance that is nearly I ,
but has different costs to the edges that leave sj. Specifically, the costs of the corresponding edges in Ij are c(sj,t) = 2, and
c(sj,u) = 1 + ϵ, where 0 < ϵ < 1 is constant. Finally, let P be a probability distribution over the set of input instances{I, I1, . . . , Ik} such that every instance is picked with probability 1/(k+ 1).
Fig. 2. The randomized lower bound instance.
Consider a truthful allocation algorithm for the problem, and let us analyze its performance on the set of input instances
{I, I1, . . . , Ik} with probability distribution P . We consider two cases, depending on the structure of the routing tree
generated by the algorithm for the input instance I .
Case I: The algorithm does not route any of the requests through u. Notice that the algorithm generates a routing
tree T = ki=1(si, t) whose workload value is optimal for I . However, one can apply arguments similar to those used in
Theorem 3.2, and demonstrate that the algorithm cannot obtain approximation guarantee better than 2/(1+ ϵ) for any of
the instances {I1, . . . , Ik}. In particular, one can easily verify that given the input instance Ij, the algorithm must route the
request rj using the edge (sj, t). Consequently, the expected approximation ratio of the algorithm on the input distribution
P is at least
1 · 1
k+ 1 +
2
1+ ϵ ·
k
k+ 1 > 2
k
(k+ 1)(1+ ϵ) .
Since one can utilize graph instances for which k → ∞, and may select any constant ϵ → 0, the theorem follows for this
case.
Case II: The algorithm routes 1 ≤ q ≤ k requests through u. Let Q ⊆ R be the set of requests that the algorithm
routes through u. Notice that the workload value of the routing tree generated by the algorithm is q, and accordingly the
approximation ratio of the algorithm is q. Additionally, one can apply arguments similar to those used in Theorem 3.2, and
demonstrate that the algorithm cannot attain a better than 2/(1+ϵ)-approximation for any of the instances {Ij : rj ∈ R\Q }.
Hence, the expected approximation ratio of the algorithm on the input distribution P is at least
q · 1
k+ 1 +
2
1+ ϵ ·
k− q
k+ 1 + 1 ·
q
k+ 1 > 2
k
(k+ 1)(1+ ϵ) ,
and thus the theorem follows also for this case. 
4. Unrelated machines scheduling
In this section, we establish a lower bound of 1+√2 on the approximation ratio of any truthful deterministicmechanism
for the unrelated machines scheduling problem when the number of machines is at least 3. Before we turn to portray the
details of our approach, we provide an abstraction of the weak monotonicity theorem, i.e., Theorem 2.2, for the problem
under consideration. Remark that the valuation function of the agent that controls machine i satisfies vi(a) = ∑j∈[m] xijtij,
where xij indicates if task j is allocated to machine i in the outcome a, and tij is the execution time of task j on machine i.
Corollary 4.1. Let t and t ′ be input matrices for the unrelated machines scheduling problem, which only differ in the execution
times of machine i. Every truthful allocation algorithm that generates allocation matrices x and x′ with respect to t and t ′ must
satisfy−
j∈[m]
(xij − x′ij)(tij − t ′ij) ≤ 0. (1)
In the following, we exploit Corollary 4.1 to derive two simple claims, which will later enable us to demonstrate the
desired lower bound. Note that the first claim extends Lemma 1 of [4].
Claim 4.2. Let x and x′ be allocation matrices generated by a truthful allocation algorithm with respect to input matrices t and
t ′, which only differ in the execution times of machine i. If every task realizes one of the following cases
• Case I: task j can only be allocated to machine i with respect to both t and t ′.2
2 We say that task j can only be allocated to machine iwith respect to input matrix t if tij ≠ ∞ and tℓj = ∞, for every ℓ ∈ [n] \ {i}.
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• Case II: t ′ij > tij and xij = 0.• Case III: t ′ij < tij and xij = 1.
then x and x′ must agree on the allocation of machine i.
Proof. If task j can only be allocated to machine i, then clearly xij = x′ij = 1. Also notice that this implies that the
corresponding weak monotonicity term, i.e., (xij − x′ij)(tij − t ′ij), equals 0, and hence it does not contribute to the left-hand
side of requirement (1) in Corollary 4.1.
Focusing on the other two cases, one can easily validate that every corresponding weak monotonicity term can only be
nonnegative. For example, if task j satisfies t ′ij > tij and xij = 0 then the corresponding weak monotonicity term reduces
to (0 − x′ij)(tij − t ′ij). This term is nonnegative as (tij − t ′ij) < 0, and x′ij ∈ {0, 1}. Consequently, in order to satisfy the weak
monotonicity theorem, it must follow that x′ij = xij for all the tasks under consideration. 
Claim 4.3. Let x and x′ be allocation matrices generated by a truthful allocation algorithm with respect to input matrices t and t ′,
and let {k, ℓ} be a set of two tasks. If tik = tiℓ = a for some a > 1, t ′ik = t ′iℓ = 1, all other execution times of t and t ′ are identical,
and x assigns exactly one of the tasks in {k, ℓ} to machine i, then x′ must assign at least one of the tasks in {k, ℓ} to machine i.
Proof. Notice that x′ik and x
′
iℓ must fulfill (1− x′ik − x′iℓ)(a− 1) ≤ 0 in order to satisfy Corollary 4.1 in the above-mentioned
setting. Accordingly, x′ must assign at least one of the tasks in {k, ℓ} to machine i. 
We are now ready to prove the aforesaid lower bound. Essentially, we prove that any truthful allocation algorithm has a
‘‘bad’’ inputmatrix for which it generates an allocationwhosemakespan value is bounded away from the optimalmakespan
value by a factor of at least 1 + √2. Remark that for ease of presentation, we may apply Claim 4.2 to input matrices t and
t ′ in which some execution times of machine i are the same. Nevertheless, the understanding between us is that there are
tiny changes in these execution times, which we neglect in order to keep the expressions simple, that satisfy the restrictions
imposed by the claim.
Theorem 4.4. The approximation ratio of any truthful deterministic mechanism for the unrelated machines scheduling problem
with at least 3machines cannot be better than 1+√2.
Proof. Consider a truthful allocation algorithm for the unrelated machines scheduling problem, and suppose that its input
is the following 3-machines 5-tasks matrix
t =
 0 ∞ ∞ √2 √2∞ 0 ∞ √2 √2
∞ ∞ 0 √2 √2
 .
Notice that this input matrix admits two distinct tasks’ allocations up to symmetries, that is, name changes of the machines
or tasks. These two possible tasks allocations are
x =
0∗ ∞ ∞ √2∗ √2∗∞ 0∗ ∞ √2 √2
∞ ∞ 0∗ √2 √2
 and y =
0∗ ∞ ∞ √2∗ √2∞ 0∗ ∞ √2 √2∗
∞ ∞ 0∗ √2 √2
 ,
where every superscript ∗ denotes an assignment of the column corresponding task to the row corresponding machine. Be
mindful of the slight abuse of notation as x and y are essentially {0, 1}-matrices that correspond to the allocations designated
by the superscripts ∗’s. We consider two cases, depending on which allocation is generated by the algorithm.
Case I: x is generated by the algorithm. Let us consider thematrix t ′, which is identical to t , but has t ′11 =
√
2. By Claim 4.2,
we know that the allocation generated by the algorithm for the first machine when t ′ is the input matrix cannot change.
Namely, the tasks allocation is√2∗ ∞ ∞ √2∗ √2∗∞ 0∗ ∞ √2 √2
∞ ∞ 0∗ √2 √2
 .
This allocation has a value of 3
√
2, while it is easy to verify that the optimal allocation has a value of
√
2. Consequently, this
proves that the algorithm cannot have approximation ratio better than 3 > 1+√2.
Case II: y is generated by the algorithm. Let us consider the matrix t ′ that has the same execution times as t with two
exceptions, which are t ′14 = t ′15 = 1. By Claim 4.3, we know that the allocation generated by the algorithm when t ′ is
the input matrix must assign at least one of the tasks {4, 5} to the first machine. Accordingly, the tasks allocation, up to
symmetry, is either
x′ =
0∗ ∞ ∞ 1∗ 1∗∞ 0∗ ∞ √2 √2
∞ ∞ 0∗ √2 √2
 or y′ =
0∗ ∞ ∞ 1∗ 1∞ 0∗ ∞ √2 √2∗
∞ ∞ 0∗ √2 √2
 .
Again, we regard two cases, depending on which allocation is generated.
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Case IIa: x′ is generated by the algorithm. Let us consider the matrix t ′′, which is identical to t ′ with a single difference that
is t ′′11 =
√
2. By Claim 4.2, we know that the allocation generated by the algorithm for the first machine when t ′′ is the input
matrix cannot change. Consequently, the tasks allocation is√2∗ ∞ ∞ 1∗ 1∗∞ 0∗ ∞ √2 √2
∞ ∞ 0∗ √2 √2
 .
Notice that this allocation has a value of
√
2 + 2, whereas the optimal allocation has a value of √2. Thus, the algorithm
cannot have approximation guarantee better than (
√
2+ 2)/√2 = 1+√2.
Case IIb: y ′ is generated by the algorithm. Let us consider a two-step transition. First, consider the input matrix t ′′ that is
identical to t ′, but has t ′′14 = 0. By Claim 4.2, we know that the allocation generated by the algorithm for the first machine
cannot change. Hence, the tasks’ allocation, up to symmetry, is0∗ ∞ ∞ 0∗ 1∞ 0∗ ∞ √2 √2∗
∞ ∞ 0∗ √2 √2
 .
Second, consider the input matrix t ′′′, which is identical to the matrix t ′′ with a single change that is t ′′′22 = 1. Again, by
Claim 4.2, we know that the allocation generated by the algorithm for the second machine cannot change. Hence, the tasks’
allocation for the second machine is 0 ∞ ∞ 0 1∞ 1∗ ∞ √2 √2∗
∞ ∞ 0 √2 √2
 .
This allocation has a value of 1+√2, while it is easy to validate that the optimal allocation has a value of 1. Therefore, the
algorithm cannot have approximation ratio better than 1+√2. 
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